Seqlense Monitoring watches on-chain wallets and order-book flow in the same place, and ties both to the person behind them. An alert names a client, not a hash. Built for the obligations CASPs and investment firms carry under MiCA, ESMA RTS, MAR and MiFID II.
Not sure which flow is which? On-chain and order book, explained side by side.
Hosted in Europe · MAR & MiFID II order-record retention · Full audit trail
Surveillance tools flag an address or a customer id. Neither is a person. Seqlense resolves both onto one identity, so a wallet flagged on Monday and a trading client flagged on Thursday stop looking like two unrelated events.
Flagged Monday. Counterparty risk on a wallet nobody can name.
Flagged Thursday. Wash trading on one book.
Below every threshold, on its own.
Three records, one person. The alerts stack on the same file, and the volume nobody saw is the sum of the three.
Nothing is inferred by heuristic. A match is an analyst's judgement, or an import from your own KYC base, and each is recorded as what it is. Guessing who somebody is would produce a false positive indistinguishable from a true one - on the data used to accuse somebody of market manipulation.
The client list is read from your order feed itself, busiest first, with a filter for the ones still waiting for a name. Match one at a time from the roster or from the identity's page, or map client ids to identities in bulk from your KYC base.
Their wallets, their client ids, every on-chain and order-book alert raised on any of them, and the notes your team left last time. Duplicate identities merge and carry everything with them; a market-abuse scan launches across every wallet the subject holds at once.
The match lives beside the order record, never inside it. Correcting who somebody is never rewrites what they did - and removing a match leaves the order records untouched.
They read different data and answer to different rules. Their findings land in the same alert list, against the same subjects. New to the distinction? The two flows, explained side by side.
Scan a wallet on demand or on a schedule. Counterparty risk, behavioural patterns and a verdict you can archive.
Run across a whole organisation's order flow. Findings come back per client, per book and per pattern, not as one verdict.
Narrowing a run to a single book loses the cross-venue signal outright. Leaving venue and instrument empty is the normal case.
A structured, auditable workflow. Each step turns raw activity - on-chain or from your own order feed - into actionable, regulator-ready evidence attached to a named subject.
A wallet scan is launched from an address, from a whole identity, or on a recurring schedule. An order-book run is launched over a window of your order flow, across every venue at once. Both can originate from the web interface, an API call, or a transaction-based trigger such as a customer withdrawal or deposit.
On-chain data is collected from Seqlense's proprietary blockchain indexer - transactions, token transfers, smart contract interactions and counterparty activity across supported chains. Order data comes from your own venue exports, ingested as CSV through the mapping wizard or pushed server-to-server through the API. Event ids are derived from content, so replaying a file that timed out converges instead of double-counting.
Raw data is normalized and enriched. Wallets are clustered, transaction sequences reconstructed, and market context such as liquidity, timing and known entities is applied. Order events are stored one row per event - never per order - with the source line from your file kept verbatim beside each one. Transactions are never analyzed in isolation.
Wallet addresses and order-book client ids are resolved onto the subjects that hold them, so activity split across chains, venues or sub-accounts is read as one person's behaviour. Matching is an analyst's judgement or an import from your KYC base - never a heuristic guess - and the match sits beside the order record rather than inside it.
Monitoring establishes behavioral baselines for wallets, clients and subjects, identifying deviations, coordination patterns and abnormal activity over time. Order-book abuse shows up in the shape of the flow - in what was cancelled, how fast, and by whom - not in any single order. This step focuses on behavior, not individual transactions.
Behaviors are evaluated through deterministic rule sets aligned with MiCA, ESMA RTS and MAR, combined with statistical and behavioral models designed to reduce false positives while remaining fully explainable. Patterns are scored against thresholds your organisation set, and a detector that lacks the data to judge reports the signal as not evaluable rather than returning a negative built on absent data.
When a risk threshold is met, alerts are generated with clear reasoning, timelines and supporting evidence - raised against the subject, not against an anonymous identifier. Analysts filter by subject type, tag, date range or source, and the link they send a colleague opens on exactly the same view. A pattern still running across daily scans does not re-raise; once resolved and recurring, it fires again.
Findings consolidate into audit-ready outputs: evidence packs, the thresholds that judged each alert, the coverage of each pattern, and an immutable audit trail of who did what and when. Identities, wallets and alerts export to CSV or JSON. Order records are held for five years, as MAR and MiFID II expect.
Regulatory rule sets and behavioral analysis across both surfaces - what happens on-chain, and what happens in the book.
Abnormal pre-event trading behavior potentially linked to the use of non-public or privileged information, correlated against wallet baselines and market timing.
Buying and selling against yourself to manufacture volume. Amounts are compared exactly, because drift there is a false negative nobody would notice.
Rapid price inflation followed by coordinated sell-offs across multiple wallets or entities, read as one movement rather than a series of unrelated trades.
One order or one transfer split into many small ones to stay under every bar. Splitting across venues is only visible to a run that reads several books at once.
Orders placed to move the price and pulled before they fill. Measured from cancel timing and order origin - which is why those fields matter in your export.
Clustering analysis surfacing coordinated wallet behavior, hidden relationships and emerging manipulation patterns. Every cluster is presented with the reasoning behind it, for an analyst to confirm or dismiss.
Detection combines deterministic regulatory rules with behavioral analysis to keep verdicts explainable, auditable and defensible. Nothing about who a subject is is ever inferred by heuristic.
No schema to conform to before you can try anything. Map your columns once, keep the profile, and reuse it for every file that venue sends.
A file loaded with the wrong timezone or the wrong separator is removed on its own, and the record that the import happened is kept and marked. No purging the workspace to fix one mistake.
Every event stores the line it came from, verbatim. Months later that is the only thing that settles a dispute over an alert.
Event ids are derived from content, so replaying a file that timed out converges instead of double-counting. Re-posting a batch is not a mistake you have to clean up.
A final-state-per-order export and a full event log both work. You map them once per venue and the profile is reused from then on.
Raising an alert is the easy half. What decides whether a tool is used is what happens when someone opens it three weeks later.
By subject type, by tag, by date range, by source. Counts run over everything that matched, not just the rows that fit on screen - and a link you send a colleague opens on exactly what you were looking at.
"Client verified, recurring false positive" belongs on the person, not on whichever alert happened to be open that day. The next recurrence does not restart the enquiry.
Deleted wallets and identities go to a trash an admin can restore from, with everything they were linked to intact. Duplicate identities merge. A bad import is undone without touching the rest.
An alert you cannot explain to a regulator is not worth raising. Every step back to the original row is kept, and nothing in the path is rewritten.
Most tables expire in weeks. The order record does not, because MAR and MiFID II expect order data to be held for five years. Shortening it is a compliance decision, not a storage default.
Who matched a client, who resolved an alert, who launched a scan, who removed an import, and when. Each line links back to the thing it touched.
Alerts carry the thresholds applied and the coverage of each pattern, so a verdict can be re-read rather than re-argued.
One tenancy key scopes every read and every write, including the queries that resolve an identity. Nothing crosses between organisations.
Fully managed SaaS, hosted in Europe. You should be able to try this with the export you already have, not after a migration project.
Your venue export, mapped once in the browser through the wizard. It is the right way to see the product on your own data this afternoon, without involving engineering or waiting on a schema agreement.
Scoped API keys against the same endpoints the interface uses. Push order events, launch wallet or flow scans, read alerts back, and drive the whole workflow from your own systems.
Webhook, Slack or Discord, filtered by severity, source and subject type, so a channel only hears what it should. Alerts reach the people who act on them without anyone watching a dashboard.
Submit scans, match clients to identities and review alerts directly in the browser. Manual investigation, case management and reporting without any technical integration at all.
The free wallet risk check runs the same read the product does, on one address, without signing up. Entity type, tags, categories, sanctions exposure and a risk score - across ten chains, rate-limited per IP. It is the shortest way to see what a verdict looks like before you decide anything.
Designed for organizations carrying market abuse surveillance obligations under MiCA, MAR and MiFID II - whether their exposure is on-chain, in the book, or both.
Order-book surveillance on your own flow and on-chain monitoring of inflows and outflows, resolved onto the same customers. Wash trading, layering, insider signals and pump & dump, with audit-ready evidence behind each alert.
One client trading under a different id per venue resolves to one subject, so flow split across books stops hiding below every threshold. Five-year order-record retention held where MAR and MiFID II expect it.
Recurring scans on customer wallets rather than a check somebody has to remember to run. Abnormal wallet behavior, fund fragmentation and counterparty exposure, with the archived report kept behind every alert.
Alerts that name a person, notes that stay on that person, filters that reproduce the view you sent a colleague, and a full log of who decided what. Mistakes are reversible; the record that they happened is not erased.
Mapping market abuse surveillance expectations under MiCA, MAR and MiFID II to current Seqlense Monitoring capabilities - detection, identity, evidence and retention.
| Requirement | Regulatory Expectation | Monitoring Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| Market Abuse Signal DetectionMiCA · MAR | Identify and monitor indicators of potential market abuse on an ongoing basis. | Continuous surveillance of on-chain activity and of your own order flow, through deterministic rule sets and behavioral analysis. |
| Insider Dealing IndicatorsMiCA · MAR | Identification of transactions potentially executed using inside or non-public information. | Detection of abnormal pre-event trading behavior, wallet deviations, and temporal correlation patterns. |
| Market Manipulation PracticesMiCA · MAR | Detection of manipulative behaviors affecting price formation or market integrity. | Wash trading, pump & dump patterns and coordinated wallet activity, scored against thresholds set per organisation. |
| Order-Book ManipulationMAR · MiFID II | Surveillance of order entry and cancellation behavior, not only executed trades. | Layering and spoofing measured from cancel timing and order origin, plus cross-venue wash trading and smurfing, read across every book in one pass. |
| Transaction StructuringMiCA | Identification of fragmented activity intended to bypass monitoring thresholds. | Wallet clustering, order-splitting analysis, and cross-wallet and cross-venue linkage through the resolved identity. |
| Attribution to a PersonMAR · MiFID II | Ability to attribute surveilled activity to the client or person responsible for it. | Wallets and order-book client ids resolved onto one subject by analyst judgement or KYC import - never by heuristic - with the match kept beside the order record. |
| Monitoring & AlertingMiCA · MAR | Ongoing surveillance mechanisms and timely alerts when risks are identified. | Automated alert generation, risk scoring and analyst review workflows, with webhook, Slack and Discord delivery filtered by severity and source. |
| Order-Record RetentionMiFID II · MAR | Order data retained and retrievable for five years. | An append-only order table with no expiry, holding one row per event and the verbatim source line from your file beside it. |
| Investigation & TraceabilityMiCA · MAR | Ability to justify decisions, reconstruct events, and maintain traceable investigation records. | Evidence timelines, the thresholds and pattern coverage that produced each verdict, investigation notes held on the subject, and a full audit trail of who did what and when. |
| Suspicious Transaction ReportingESMA RTS | Report suspicious transactions and orders with the supporting detail expected of a STOR. | Each alert consolidates the evidence a STOR requires - the source rows, the pattern that fired, the thresholds applied and the subject it is attributed to - exportable as CSV or JSON. |
This coverage focuses on detection, attribution and investigation support. Filing obligations should be assessed against each organization's own internal compliance procedures.
The blockchain networks covered by Seqlense Monitoring for on-chain market abuse detection and surveillance.
The free wallet risk check covers ten of these networks. More chains are being added regularly - need a specific one? Let us know.
Start with a wallet in the free check, or bring one venue export and watch the first alerts land against named clients.
The full methodology: detection surfaces, identity resolution, evidence model and regulatory mapping.
Endpoints for pushing order events, launching wallet and flow scans, and reading alerts back into your own systems.
One reads a public ledger that belongs to nobody, the other reads the trading system your own flow passes through. They catch different halves of the same behaviour, which is why both engines are here. The full explanation, side by side.
On-chain: insider trading signals, pump-and-dump, wash trading, fund fragmentation and coordinated wallet behavior. In the order book: wash trading, smurfing, layering and spoofing, read across every venue at once rather than one book at a time.
18 networks including Ethereum, Bitcoin, BNB Chain, Polygon, Arbitrum, Optimism, Avalanche, Solana and more. Full list below.
Not to start. Order data goes in as a CSV through the mapping wizard, and a wallet is scanned by pasting its address. The API is there when you want to automate it.
CSV exports, whatever the column names. You map them once per venue and the profile is reused for every later file. Both a final-state-per-order export and a full event log are accepted.
Yes, on a wallet: the free risk check runs without signing up. Order-book monitoring needs a workspace.
No. Monitoring ships with rule sets aligned with MiCA, ESMA RTS and MAR. Thresholds are then set per organisation to match your own risk policy, and the thresholds that judged an alert are written into it.
No. Matching a client id or a wallet to an identity is always an analyst's judgement or an import from your own KYC base. Nothing is inferred by heuristic - a guess there would produce a false positive indistinguishable from a true one.
In Europe. One tenancy key scopes every read and every write, including the queries that resolve an identity. Nothing crosses between organisations.
Five years, with no automatic expiry, because that table is the order record MAR and MiFID II expect you to hold. Shortening it is your decision, not a storage default.
Each alert consolidates what a Suspicious Transaction and Order Report needs: the verbatim source rows, the pattern that fired, the thresholds applied and the subject it is attributed to - aligned with the ESMA RTS on suspicious transaction and order reporting, and exportable as CSV or JSON.